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Abstract
Using structural VAR models with short-run restrictions appropriate for Canada and the
United States, we empirically examine whether openness and macroeconomic interde-
pendence matter for the impact on and transmission to stock prices of monetary policy
shocks. We ¯nd that, in Canada, the immediate response of stock prices to a domestic
contractionary monetary policy shock is small and the dynamic response is brief, whereas
in the U.S., the immediate response of stock prices to a similar shock is relatively large
and the dynamic response is relatively prolonged. We argue that these results are largely
driven by di®erences in dynamic responses of domestic short-term interest rates to mon-
etary policy shocks, and are ultimately due to structural di®erences between the two
countries that we model in this paper.
Keywords: monetary policy shocks, stock prices, open economy, structural vector autore-
gressive model









Stock markets are notoriously sensitive to changes in monetary policy. But this sensitivity
may vary across di®erent economies. In this paper we investigate whether the response
of stock markets to changes in monetary policy di®er signi¯cantly between a small open
economy (Canada) and a large and relatively-closed economy (the United States, hence-
forth U.S.). This is motivated by the possibility that the impact of monetary policy on
asset prices varies signi¯cantly in economies with di®erent degrees of trade and ¯nancial
market openness, and macroeconomic interdependence. There are at least four theoretical
reasons underlying this possibility.
First, small open economies tend to have less diversi¯ed economic structures than large
and relatively-closed economies do. In this regard, the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to asset prices in small open economies works through a smaller set of sectors
and industries, possibly leading to di®erent dynamic responses in asset prices. Second,
international trade is typically a larger share of GDP in small economies than in large and
relatively-closed economies. Thus, the degree of trade openness may in°uence the impact
and transmission of monetary policy shocks on domestic asset prices. Third, stock prices
in small open economies are susceptible to international capital °ows. Thus, the degree
of ¯nancial market openness may a®ect asset price adjustments after monetary policy
shocks. Fourth, di®erent degrees of international macroeconomic interdependence may
also a®ect the transmission of monetary policy shocks to asset prices. The exchange rate
in small open economies opens the possibility of an additional propagation mechanism
that is absent in large economies, which have a major in°uence on the rest of the world.1
Given these theoretical considerations, in this paper we speci¯cally address two impor-
tant and related empirical issues: whether trade openness, ¯nancial market openness, or
macroeconomic interdependence matter for (i) the impact on and (ii) the transmission to
stock prices of monetary policy shocks.
Our empirical results suggest that indeed openness and macroeconomic interdepen-
1A separate issue is whether monetary policy should target asset price volatility. See, Bernanke and
Gertler (2001), Geithner (2006), and Roubini (2006), for a recent debate relevant to the U.S. There
appears to be fewer compelling reasons to target asset price volatility in small open economies. See
HÄ ordahl and Packer (2007) for a succinct review.
1dence matter signi¯cantly in terms of the overall response of stock prices to unanticipated
changes in monetary policy. Using structural VAR models with short-run restrictions, we
¯nd that in Canada the immediate response of stock prices to a domestic contractionary
monetary policy shock is small and that the dynamic response is brief. By contrast, in the
U.S. the immediate response of stock prices to a domestic contractionary monetary policy
shock is relatively large and the dynamic response is relatively prolonged. We also pro-
vide an economic explanation of these di®erences, which are largely driven by di®erences
in dynamic responses of domestic short-term interest rates to monetary policy shocks in
Canada and the U.S., and are ultimately due to structural di®erences between the two
countries that we model in this paper.
Our ¯ndings underscore for Canada the relative importance of ¯nancial openness for
the transmission of monetary policy shocks to stock prices. And, as an indication of
strong macroeconomic interdependence, we ¯nd that changes in the U.S. federal funds
rate signi¯cantly a®ect the forecast error variance of the Canadian stock prices. While
we ¯nd that the overall impact of external demand shocks on Canadian stock prices is
relatively small, our interpretation of this ¯nding is that the °oating exchange rate regime
provides a cushion for the real sector in Canada.
Even though monetary policy primarily regulates the aggregate demand, we think of
asset and stock prices as an important channel of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Stock prices in°uence ¯nancial wealth, and hence a®ect consumption, investment and
labor supply decisions (e.g., Poterba (2000) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2004)). More-
over, the share of ¯nancial assets in household wealth has been growing rapidly in both
Canada and the U.S.2 Thus, it is increasingly important to understand whether, and how,
monetary policy a®ects stock prices over time in the context of trade and ¯nancial market
openness, and macroeconomic interdependence.
Despite the growing prominence of the link between asset prices and aggregate de-
mand, most empirical open economy models continue to rely on the conventional Mundell-
Fleming framework. In this framework, given that households divide a ¯xed amount of
wealth between a (riskless) bond portfolio and domestic money holdings, one can write
2In the United States, either directly or indirectly, more than two thirds of the households own ¯nancial
securities (Wol®, 2006: Table 5). In Canada, about one-third of the households own ¯nancial securities
as part of their overall wealth (Pichette, 2004).
2down equilibrium conditions in terms of either the bond market or the money market,
which typically is the one speci¯ed in the empirical models. The bond portfolio, on the
other hand, consists of domestic and foreign bonds, which are perfect substitutes. Conse-
quently, empirical models appeal to the uncovered interest parity condition to link interest
rates for domestic and foreign bonds to the exchange rate.
In our analysis, for the Canadian economy, we adopt the basic features of the Mundell-
Fleming-type small open economy model. However, we extend this framework by includ-
ing stocks in the menu of assets in the domestic portfolio. We allow stock prices to depend
on real and nominal variables, and allow stock prices to change in response to portfolio
shocks. We model the U.S. economy following the lead of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1996, 1999), but also augment their model by including stocks as a component of
wealth.
From a methodological standpoint, the core of our empirical analysis is the identi¯ca-
tion of the impact of monetary policy shocks on stock prices. We follow the extensive
empirical literature using vector autoregressive models (VARs) to examine this interac-
tion. There are three commonly used methods of identi¯cation in these VAR models:
(1) Recursive VARs, which assume a causal chain among variables, whereby the ¯rst
variable in the VAR system is assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to all
the remaining variables, and the second variable is contemporaneously exogenous
to all except the ¯rst variable, and so on (Sims 1980).3
(2) Structural VARs with long-run restrictions, which impose the restriction that changes
in the money supply have no long-run e®ects on the real variables (Blanchard and
Quah 1989).4
(3) Structural VARs with short-run restrictions, which impose restrictions on the con-
temporaneous (\short-run") e®ects of shocks upon certain variables included in the
model (Bernanke 1986, and Sims 1986). This is the approach we take in this paper.
3For example, Thorbecke (1997), Patelis (1997), and Park and Ratti (2000) use this approach to
identify the impact of monetary policy shocks on stock prices.
4For example, Lastrapes (1998) uses this approach to identify the impact of monetary policy shocks
on stock prices.
3We take the third approach because there are several important advantages to estimat-
ing the interaction between monetary policy and stock prices using short-run restrictions:
it allows us|within a uni¯ed empirical framework|to impose (arguably) weak restric-
tions based on economic and structural considerations, to use statistical model selection
techniques in conjunction with macroeconomic theory, and to identify structural shocks,
including unanticipated changes in monetary policy. Earlier studies also provide a use-
ful guidance on this choice. Kim and Roubini (2000) argue that recursive VAR models
for open economies lead to a number of anomalies, which they resolve using structural
VARs. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2006) argue that structural VARs with
short-run restrictions yield remarkably sharp inference in the context response analysis
with structural shocks. According to Faust and Leeper (1997), VAR models with long-run
restrictions, by contrast, do not necessarily lead to unique short-run dynamics.
There are complementary approaches to structural VARs. Rigobon and Sack (2004)
and Corallo (2006) use a heteroskedasticity-based approach. Their identi¯cation method-
ology involves examining the changes in the covariance between interest rates and asset
prices within a window when the variance of the monetary policy shock is a priori known
to have shifted. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) employ an event-study approach to exam-
ine the unexpected and expected components of the change in monetary policy on stock
prices. Dufour and Tessier (2006) study the relationship between stock prices, interest
rates, in°ation, output, and money aggregates in an unrestricted VAR, but their main
focus is on multi-horizon Granger-causality tests.
While these studies use di®erent methods to identify the impact of monetary policy
on stock prices, their ¯ndings suggest that monetary policy shocks a®ect stock prices in
important ways. There is considerable research using the U.S. data. For instance, Thor-
becke (1997), Patelis (1997), and Park and Ratti (2000) use orthogonalized innovations in
the federal funds rate to measure monetary policy shocks, and ¯nd that a contractionary
monetary policy shock leads to a fall in stock prices. Thorbecke (1997) ¯nds that an
unanticipated one percent increase in the federal funds rate leads upon impact to about
0.8% decrease in stock prices. Rigobon and Sack (2004) ¯nd that a 25 basis points in-
crease in the three-month interest rate results in a 1.7% decline in the S&P 500 index and
a 2.4% decline in the Nasdaq index.
4There are also several studies that provide comparative international evidence on the
link between monetary policy and stock prices. Lastrapes (1998) presents cross-country
evidence, and ¯nds that in Canada an unanticipated 1% decrease in the nominal money
stock (M1) leads to a 1.6% fall in stock prices (at the trough of the impulse response),
whereas in the U.S. a similar shock reduces stock prices by about 2.4%. However, Siklos
and Anusiewicz (1998) ¯nd that an unanticipated decrease in Canadian M1 weekly growth
leads to an increase in the Canadian stock index. Corallo (2006) studies the e®ect of
monetary policy on asset prices in Germany and the U.K. using the heteroskedasticity-
based approach, and ¯nds that an unexpected increase in the interest rate depresses equity
prices, but this relationship is not statistically signi¯cant. Our ¯ndings suggest that an
unanticipated 25 basis points increase in the federal funds rate leads, upon impact, U.S.
stock prices to decline by 0.55 percent, whereas a similar increase in the overnight interest
rate in Canada leads to stock prices to decline by only 0.0025 percent.
The relative di®erence in openness between Canada and the U.S., and the macroeco-
nomic interdependence mostly running from the large U.S. economy to the small Cana-
dian economy are the distinguishing features of our analysis. It is perhaps surprising that
these di®erences have not been fully explored in the existing literature on the link between
stock prices and monetary policy shocks. In a framework that is closest to ours, Lastrapes
(1998) uses the same structural model with long-run restrictions for eight countries (G7
plus the Netherlands), but does not control for their potential di®erences in economic
structure, and does not allow for macroeconomic interdependence.5 Consequently, our
analysis builds on a framework that explicitly models the structural di®erences between
Canada and the U.S., and that accounts for the di®erences in their responses of stock
prices to monetary policy shocks in an internally consistent way.
We organize the paper as follows. In section 2, we provide a background discussion
of monetary policy instruments and our structural VARs. In section 3, we present our
baseline VAR models, and discuss the identi¯cation strategy. In section 4, we present and
discuss our key empirical ¯ndings. In section 5, we evaluate the robustness of our results
to alternative identi¯cation restrictions. We conclude in section 6.
5Dufour and Tessier (2006) recognize these di®erences between Canada and the U.S., but they do not
incorporate variables related to ¯nancial market openness into their model.
52 Background
Before we formally present our structural VAR models, it is useful to discuss several
background issues concerning our choice of the sample period, and monetary policy in-
struments. We start our sample period from January 1988 because of two important
considerations: (i) the continuity and similarity of monetary policy operating procedures
in the Canadian and U.S. economies, and (ii) the growing integration of the two economies
since 1988.
Since 1988 both economies have been marked by continuity and similarity in terms of
their monetary policy instruments, objectives, and low in°ation. This continuity in the
U.S. has been primarily characterized by the \Greenspan regime," whereby the federal
funds rate is the key instrument of monetary policy.6 Similarly, this continuity in Canada
has been characterized by the \in°ation-targeting regime," whereby the overnight interest
rate is the key policy instrument.7 Consequently, we use the federal funds rate in the U.S.
and the overnight interest rate in Canada as the monetary policy instrument.
Since 1988, there has also been an increasing integration of the Canadian and U.S.
economies. The 1988 free trade agreement has accelerated and bolstered the already
extensive economic integration of these two economies. Of course, given the signi¯cant
di®erence in the sizes of these economies, the U.S. economy has a considerably larger
in°uence on the Canadian economy. Currently, the Canadian exports to the U.S. amount
to about 35 percent of the Canadian GDP, and the weight of the Canadian trade with
the U.S. represents above 75 percent of the total Canadian foreign trade. The ¯nancial
sectors in both the U.S. and Canada are also highly integrated. These considerations
6See also http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/monetary/tools.html, and Bernanke and
Blinder (1992). Bernanke and Mihov (1998) consider alternative monetary policy instruments such as the
federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, borrowed reserves, and total reserves, and examine innovations
to these instruments. They ¯nd that innovations to the federal funds rate perform as the best indicator
of unanticipated changes in monetary policy for the post-1988 period in the U.S.
7Although in January 1988, John Crow, the Governor of Bank of Canada, stated the monetary policy
objective as \price stability," the Bank of Canada (\Bank") later de¯ned this objective as in°ation
targeting, with explicit targets since February 1991. The Bank has also been explicit about the overnight
interest rate as the monetary policy instruments, at least since 1994, when it started making the target
band for the overnight rate public (but not the target rate within this band). Since early 1999, the Bank
has been announcing the target rate. Thiessen (1995) also emphasizes the overnight interest rate as the
key instrument of monetary policy in Canada.
6lead us to model the Canadian economy with appropriate channels for macroeconomic
interdependence. Clearly, some of these channels are not essential for modeling the U.S.
economy.
Aside from the di®erences in the degree of macroeconomic interdependence, in our
analysis, oil prices also play di®erent roles in the two countries: the U.S. is a net oil
importer whereas Canada is a net oil exporter. Thus, in our U.S. model below, we
explicitly control for the adverse e®ects of oil price hikes.8
3 Modeling strategy
While our primary interest is in the relationship between monetary policy and stock
prices, we model this relationship within a general equilibrium framework in which major
macroeconomic variables interact contemporaneously and over time. We thus examine
the qualitative and quantitative information about the relationship between monetary
policy shocks and stock prices using multivariate structural VAR models for the U.S. and
Canadian economies.
3.1 The structural VAR models
The baseline U.S. VAR model consists of, as in Christiano et al. (1996), real output (Y ),
the price level (P), the money supply (M2), the federal funds rate (R), and the price of
oil (OP), which are standard in the empirical monetary business-cycle models of the U.S.,
plus stock prices (SP), which are included to control for (stock market driven) wealth
e®ects. The baseline Canadian VAR model, on the other hand, consists of real output,
the price level, the money supply, the overnight interest rate, the US-Canada bilateral
nominal exchange rate (E), and the U.S. federal funds rate, which are also standard in the
Mundell-Fleming-type models for open economies,9 plus stock prices, which are included
to control for wealth e®ects. Our empirical model for Canada accommodates a range of
8Incidentally, Canada switched from being a net oil importer to a net oil exporter in 1988, which is the
beginning of our sample period. Jim¶ enez-Rodriguez and S¶ anchez (2004) discuss the di®erential in°uence
of oil price shocks on the Canadian and U.S. economies. See, also, Hamilton and Herrera (2004) for an
assessment of the impact of oil price shocks on the US economy.
9See, e.g., Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000).
7open economy models with incomplete markets.10
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where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, ¯l is a matrix of parameters, yt¡l for l =
1;:::;p is a vector of lagged y variables, and the disturbance term, ut, is a vector of white
noises with E(ut) = 0, and E(utu
0
t) = §. The reduced-form disturbances, ut, are linear
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0. There are six
structural shocks in the U.S. model, and seven structural shocks in the Canadian model.
In the next section, we discuss our strategy to identify the structural shocks.
3.2 Identi¯cation
In order to identify the structural shocks, we impose a set of restrictions on the contempo-
raneous correlations in our structural VAR model (2) to re°ect the operating procedures
of the two central banks (as discussed above in section 2) and basic economic principles.
We start the discussion with the identi¯cation of monetary policy shocks (ºMP), because
this identi¯cation is central to our analysis and the methodology is similar in both the
Canadian and U.S. models.
As in Christiano et al. (1996) and Kim and Roubini (2000), we characterize mone-
tary policy by a feedback rule, which is a linear function relating the monetary policy
10We use a combination of economic theory and statistical criteria (the Schwartz and Akaike information
criteria, and log-likelihood function values) for model selection. Our baseline speci¯cations for Canada and
the U.S. are an outcome of this model-search approach. At the same time, one fundamental limitation is
that the short-run restrictions and the models on which these restrictions are imposed can only be jointly
tested. In section 5, we thus discuss the sensitivity of our results to alternative model speci¯cations and
identi¯cation restrictions.
8instrument to the information set available to the central bank. We identify monetary
policy shocks as innovations to the monetary policy instrument given a set of conditioning
variables. The monetary policy instrument is the federal funds rate for the U.S. and the
overnight interest rate for Canada. The conditioning variables for the Fed's feedback rule
include the contemporaneous values of money supply and lagged values of all the variables
included in the model. The conditioning variables for the Bank of Canada's feedback rule
include the contemporaneous values of money supply and exchange rate, as well as the
lagged values of all the variables included in the model.11 We thus have for the U.S. and
Canadian models, respectively,









4(CAyt¡l) + ºCAMP;t; (4)
where ºMP;t is the monetary policy shock; fi and f¤
i are the linear functions of lagged vari-
ables in the ith equation in the U.S. and Canadian structural VAR models, respectively;
and aij and a¤
ij are the jth parameters in the ith equation in the U.S. and Canadian VAR
models, respectively. (All variables, except the interest rate, are expressed in natural
logarithms.) According to the Bank of Canada's view of the in°ation process in Canada,
a depreciation of the Canadian dollar (an increase in E) corresponds to an increase in
domestic prices. Our formulation captures that expectation and suggests that the Bank
may respond by raising the instrument interest rate.
We attribute monetary policy shocks to three possible sources (see also Christiano et
al., 1996). The ¯rst source is the exogenous shocks to the preferences of central bankers,
such as shifts in the relative weights given to unemployment, in°ation, ¯nancial market
stability, and foreign exchange rate stability. The second source is exogenous variations
in policy to validate private agents' expectations about the central bank policy. Central
banks may wish to avoid the costs of disappointing private agents' expectations and shocks
to these expectations would in turn lead to monetary policy shocks. The third source is
various technical factors, such as measurement error in the real time data available to
11The operating procedures of the central banks focus more on M2 than on M1 as the primary monetary
aggregate. Our statistical model selection criteria also decisively favored the models with M2 rather than
M1. We also estimated our models using M1. These results are available upon request.
9the central bank. In addition, we will provide an extensive discussion of the in°uence of
alternative conditioning variables in the feedback rule on our results in section 5.
The rest of our identi¯cation methodology re°ects the interactions among three main
markets (the goods, money, and stock markets), as well as, in the case of the Canadian
model, the external sector. For each market we specify equilibrium conditions. We now
discuss the remaining identifying restrictions of the U.S. and Canadian models separately.
3.2.1 Identi¯cation in the baseline U.S. model
In addition to the monetary policy shocks, in the baseline U.S. model, there are ¯ve
other structural shocks. These are aggregate supply, aggregate demand, money market
equilibrium, portfolio, and oil price shocks. Now we discuss them in turn.
An aggregate supply shock (ºAS) re°ects exogenous changes in productivity, mark-ups,
and other supply side factors. We identify aggregate supply shocks by specifying real
output as a function of the contemporaneous value of the oil price and the lagged values
of all the variables included in the model. Thus, we have
Yt = a10 ¡ a16OPt + f1(yt¡l) + ºUSAS;t: (5)
An aggregate demand shock (ºAD) re°ects an exogenous impact of ¯scal policy (both
spending and revenue shocks), wage-push in°ation, and other demand side factors. We
identify aggregate demand shocks by specifying aggregate demand as a function of the
contemporaneous values of the price level and the oil price (to control for the impact
of relative price changes on aggregate demand), as well as the lagged values of all the
variables in the model. Of course, in equilibrium the aggregate quantity demanded equals
that supplied, so we write:
Pt = a20 ¡ a21Yt + a26OPt + f2(yt¡l) + ºUSAD;t: (6)
A shock to the money market equilibrium (ºMME) originates from an exogenous change
in the velocity of money. We represent the money market equilibrium with a standard
quantity-theory-of-money speci¯cation, whereby the demand for real money balance de-
pends on income and the opportunity cost of holding money, the nominal interest rate:
M2t ¡ Pt = a30 + a31Yt ¡ a34Rt + f3(yt¡l) + ºMME;t: (7)
10A portfolio shock (ºPORT) represents an exogenous change in the demand for equities,
which we interpret as an innovation in the time-varying equity risk premium. Stock
markets aggregate all the publicly and privately available information, so stock prices to
depend contemporaneously on all the variables in the model plus the portfolio shock (see
equation (8), row 5).
Finally, to identify the oil price shock (ºOP) we specify oil price as a contemporaneously
exogenous variable, and allow it to be in°uenced only by the lagged values of all other
endogenous variables (see equation (8), row 6).
We name the reduced-form shocks after the corresponding endogenous variables. For
instance, the reduced-form output shock corresponds to uY in the output equation. For
the U.S. model, we add \US" to the subscript of each of the reduced-form and structural













1 0 0 0 0 a16
a21 1 0 0 0 ¡a26
¡a31 ¡1 1 a34 0 0
0 0 a43 1 0 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 1 a56











































































3.2.2 Identi¯cation in the baseline Canadian model
In addition to the monetary policy shocks, in the baseline Canadian model, there are six
other structural shocks. These are aggregate supply, aggregate demand, money market
equilibrium, portfolio, external demand, and U.S. monetary policy shocks. (Our labeling
convention for the reduced-form and structural shocks is identical to the one we used for
the U.S. model.) Now we discuss them in turn.
The identi¯cation of the structural aggregate supply, money market equilibrium, and
portfolio shocks in the baseline Canadian VAR model and their interpretations are iden-
tical to those for the U.S. model. The only di®erence is that to account for global shocks
to the marginal product of capital, we augment the supply equation for Canada with the
contemporaneous value of the U.S. federal funds rate, which is a proxy for global marginal
11product of capital (see below equation (9), row 1).12 To identify portfolio shocks, we con-
tinue to let stock prices to depend contemporaneously on all the variables in the model
plus the portfolio shock (see equation (8), row 5). The rest of the identifying restrictions
in the baseline Canadian model are as follows.
In the context of Canada, we divide aggregate demand into domestic demand and
external demand, and model them separately. In particular, we specify a domestic demand
for goods equation, which is determined by the price level in Canada, the exchange rate
and the foreign interest rate, as well as the lagged values of all the variables included in
the model (see equation (8), row 2).13 Thus, with some abuse of language, an aggregate
demand shock in the Canadian system refers to an unexpected change in ¯scal policy
(both spending and revenue shocks), wage-push in°ation, and other factors that determine
domestic demand for goods.
The external demand for Canadian goods, on the other hand, depends in part on the
exchange rate. We model the unexpected changes in the external demand as transmitted
through the unexpected movements in the exchange rate and refer to them as trade shocks,
ºCATR (see equation (8), row 6).14 An unexpected decline in the U.S. demand for Canadian
goods, for instance, would lead to an unexpected depreciation of the Canadian dollar. In
the baseline model, exchange markets aggregate all the publicly and privately available
information, and that shocks to the exchange rate originate from contemporaneous values
of all the variables in the system, except the stock prices.15
Finally, we include the U.S. federal funds rate in the Canadian models as a contem-
poraneously exogenous variable, and label the unexpected changes in this variable as the
U.S. monetary policy shocks, ºUSMP (see equation (8), row 7). We should note that our
speci¯cation allows both anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy changes in the
12The money market equilibrium condition is identical to that in the U.S. model, and is standard in
open economy models, which assume no foreign currency holdings.
13We use the exchange rate and foreign interest rate, rather than the domestic interest rate, by appealing
to the uncovered interest parity condition. We use the federal funds rate as the foreign interest rate in
the Canadian model.
14In the new open economy models, the exchange rate is also the main channel of transmission of
external shocks; see, e.g., Murchison and Rennison (2006, pp. 90{91).
15We have also estimated the speci¯cation in which the exchange rate responds to all the contempora-
neous values of the model variables including the stock price. This is one place where statistical model
selection criteria favored the model that excludes the contemporaneous values of stock prices, suggesting
that they contain no information above and beyond those already included in the VAR system.
12U.S. to in°uence Canadian real and nominal variables through both trade and ¯nancial
market openness.16
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Our data are monthly and cover the period from January 1988 to December 2003.17 We
measure real output by industrial production index, the price level by the consumer price
index (CPI), and stock prices by a broad market index: S&P 500 for the U.S., and TSE
300 for Canada.18 We normalize stock indexes by CPIs, so our interpretation of changes in
stock prices is in real terms. We measure the exchange rate as the Canadian dollar price of
one U.S. dollar, so an increase in E corresponds to a depreciation of the Canadian dollar.
We express all variables in natural logarithms, except the interest rates. Appendix A
provides more details on our variables and data sources.
16Our short-run identi¯cation restrictions for the money market, monetary policy, and external demand
blocks of the baseline Canadian VAR model, and aggregate demand, aggregate supply, money market
and oil price blocks of the U.S. VAR model are identical to those imposed by Kim and Roubini (2000) on
all the non-U.S. G7 economies. Kim and Roubini (2000) also report that excluding oil prices from their
Canadian VAR model had no qualitative impact on their results.
17We reserved the monthly observations from 1987 for lags. We have also used a longer sample from
January 1982 to December 2003 and veri¯ed by a Chow test that, for the monetary policy reaction
function and the stock price equations, there was indeed a structural change in January 1988 in both the
Canadian and the U.S. data. We end the sample in 2004 to mitigate the in°uence of data revisions on
the results.
18The TSE 300 Composite Index was renamed the S&P/TSX Composite Index on May 1, 2002.
134.2 Unit root tests and model selection
Both the baseline U.S. and Canadian VAR models (8) and (9) are over-identi¯ed. There-
fore, we ¯rst estimate the lag coe±cients in these models (in levels) by the ordinary least
squares (OLS) method, and then estimate the free contemporaneous coe±cients by the
full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. Finally, we identify the structural
shocks. The time-series data in our models are non-stationary and cointegrated. In
this case, the OLS method delivers consistent estimates of the parameters. Indeed, the
augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests indicate that a unit root cannot be
rejected in all series except Canadian overnight interest rate and the federal funds rate.
The cointegration tests also show that these variables are cointegrated.19
The Chow tests show that we cannot reject the hypothesis of structural change in the
stock price equations starting from January 1996, which is the beginning of the run-up
in the North American stock markets. We ¯nd that a dummy variable for the period
from January 1996 to December 2002 is suitable for capturing the unusual behavior of
the stock prices. The likelihood ratio tests show that this dummy variable matters for
our VAR models. Thus, each equation in the VAR models contains a constant and a
period-speci¯c dummy variable. Accordingly, our interpretation of the response of stock
prices to structural shocks is net of such structural breaks.
To select the lag length, we use the small-sample modi¯ed likelihood ratio test (Sims
1980). Based on these likelihood ratio tests, we include nine lags for the US model (l = 9),
and six lags for the Canadian model (l = 6).20
19See, e.g., Hamilton (1994, pp. 454{460) on the superconsistency of OLS estimates, and on appropri-
ateness of a VAR in levels relative to a VAR in ¯rst di®erences when there are cointegrating relationships
(p. 652). For instance, most macroeconomic models imply a cointegrating relation between income and
wealth (as proxied by stock prices here). In a cointegrated VAR model, ¯rst di®erencing leads to mis-
speci¯cation since it omits error correction mechanisms.
20We started with 12-month lags and shortened them progressively to 9-month, 6-month, 3-month and
1-month. The likelihood ratio tests support 9 lags for the U.S. model and 6 lags for the Canadian model
at the 10% signi¯cance level. The values of the BIC for these speci¯cations also con¯rm our choice of
lags.
144.3 Impulse responses
4.3.1 The baseline U.S. model
Figure 1 displays the dynamic responses to structural shocks in the baseline U.S. model
speci¯ed in equation (8). The intervals between the dashed lines are the 95% con¯dence
intervals.21 Column legends in the ¯gure list types of structural shocks (USAS, USAD,
USMME, USMP, USPORT, and OP), and row legends show macroeconomic variables
(USY, USP, USM2, USR, USSP, and OP) that respond to these structural shocks. In-
dividual graphs show the time path of a macroeconomic variable in reaction to a speci¯c
structural shock.
In the monetary business cycle literature the responses of output, prices, and monetary
aggregates to monetary policy shocks have been extensively studied. Our estimation re-
sults show that the dynamic responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock (USMP)
in our baseline U.S. model are consistent with those familiar estimates.22 In particular,
an unexpected increase in the federal funds rate leads to a sharp and persistent drop in
M2, a gradual, but highly signi¯cant and persistent drop in real output, and a relatively
sluggish decline in the price level. At the same time, the nominal interest rate remains
above its pre-shock level for about a year. The combination of falling real output and
rising interest rates lead to a drop in stock prices, which remain below their pre-shock
levels for about two years. We will discuss the magnitude and economic signi¯cance of the
estimated impact of monetary policy shocks on stock prices in more detail below. Here it
su±ces to note that qualitatively our estimates are remarkably similar to those estimated
in the earlier literature, some of which use complementary methodologies (e.g., Rigobon
and Sack 2004).
In addition to monetary policy shocks, both portfolio and oil price shocks have sig-
ni¯cant impact on the stock prices in the U.S. A portfolio shock (USPORT), which we
interpret as an unanticipated decrease in the equity risk premium, has a large and per-
sistent positive impact on the U.S. stock prices. An oil price shock (OP), on the other
21These con¯dence intervals are computed by the importance sampling Bayesian Monte Carlo method
suggested by Sims and Zha (1999). The estimation is done by the RATS routine \montezha.prg."
22We implement a contractionary monetary policy shock by a positive one standard deviation innovation
in the monetary policy reaction function in equation (3).
15hand, has an immediate negative impact on stock prices in the U.S.
The econometric estimates of our VAR model are economically plausible in several
other dimensions. Consider, for instance, the estimated dynamic responses to structural
aggregate supply (USAS) and demand shocks (USAD). A positive supply shock tends to
have no signi¯cant short- or medium-term e®ect on the price level. However, a positive
supply shock has a signi¯cant impact on the interest rate in the short run, and on M2
in the medium to long run. Stock prices respond positively to rising real output, with
stock prices peaking two years after the shock. On the other hand, a shock to aggregate
demand leads to a signi¯cant and persistent increase in the price level. Upon impact, the
short-term interest rate also rises, perhaps in part due to the endogenous response of the
monetary authority to rising prices. This leads to a short-lived decline in real output.
Stock prices respond negatively in the short-run to rising prices, rising interest rates and
falling real output. Overall, then our results are consistent with the view that stock prices
in the U.S. rise in response to a positive productivity shock, are negatively correlated with
in°ation, and fall in response to an unanticipated increase the federal funds rate and oil
prices.23
4.3.2 The baseline Canadian model
Figure 2 shows the estimated impulse responses to structural shocks of the baseline Cana-
dian model speci¯ed in equation (9). Again, since it has received considerable attention
in the existing literature, we start our discussion with the responses of model variables
to a contractionary monetary policy shock (CAMP), which increases the overnight inter-
est rate (CAR). In response to a contractionary monetary policy shock in Canada, the
monetary aggregate (CAM2) falls immediately, and real output falls in the short and
medium run. Consistent with the uncovered interest parity condition, an unexpected in-
crease in the Canadian short-term interest rate corresponds to an expected depreciation
23Several other aspects of the model are broadly consistent with a range of monetary business cycle
models, and worth mentioning|although they are not the primary focus of this paper. For instance,
real output (USY) responds positively to a portfolio shock (USPORT), or an unanticipated decrease
in the equity risk premium. Also, shocks to money market equilibrium (USMME) have a statistically
insigni¯cant and economically small immediate impact on real output (USY), but they exert a statistically
signi¯cant and immediate impact on the short-term interest rate (USR). The responses of the model
variables to oil price shocks (OP) are also economically plausible.
16of the exchange rate (+ is a depreciation).24 In addition, in response to a contractionary
monetary policy shock (CAMP) Canadian stock prices (CASP) fall immediately, but the
impact is economically small, and the dynamic impact is not highly persistent. Our re-
sults also show that shocks to the Canadian overnight interest rate have no statistically
signi¯cant impact on the U.S. federal funds rate. By contrast, and consistent with our
conceptualization of macroeconomic interdependence, a contractionary monetary policy
change in the U.S. (USMP) leads to a higher nominal interest rate in Canada, has a sig-
ni¯cant impact on Canadian real output in all horizons, except the short run, and leads
to an expected appreciation of the Canadian dollar|which is again consistent with the
uncovered interest parity condition.
Our ¯ndings further identify several major structural shocks that have signi¯cant in-
°uences on the Canadian stock prices. An unexpected positive shock to Canadian aggre-
gate supply (CAAS) raises stock prices in the short run, whereas an aggregate demand
(CAAD) shock has the opposite immediate e®ect. Positive portfolio shocks (CAPORT),
which we interpret as unanticipated reductions in the equity risk premium, raise stock
prices substantially, contractionary U.S. monetary policy shocks (USMP) dip Canadian
stock prices brie°y, but raise them in the medium term. An external trade shock (CATR)
leads to an unexpected depreciation of the Canadian dollar, which in turn may re°ect
a decline in rest-of-the-world demand for Canadian goods. The impact of this shock on
Canadian stock prices is relatively muted. Overall, these ¯ndings suggest that ¯nancial
market openness plays a substantial role for Canadian stock prices, whereas the external
demand shocks appear to be somewhat less signi¯cant, partly re°ecting the fact that the
adjustments in the nominal exchange rate cushion part of the adverse consequences of
shifts in the demand for Canadian goods.
As further evidence on the economically plausible estimates that emerge from the
baseline Canadian VAR model, we refer the reader to the estimated dynamic responses
to structural aggregate supply (CAAS) and demand shocks (CAAD). Qualitatively, the
responses of Canadian price level, M2, and the short-term interest rate to Canadian
24Our results do not show a statistically signi¯cant impact of a contractionary monetary policy on the
CPI. This ¯nding is common in the literature, and it should be viewed in relation to the overall empirical
performance of our VAR model.
17aggregate supply and demand shocks are remarkably similar to their U.S. counterparts.25
4.4 Comparative analysis of stock prices
Our estimates of dynamic responses to structural shocks for the U.S. and Canada suggest
that individual impacts of aggregate supply, aggregate demand, monetary policy and
portfolio shocks on stock prices is relatively short lived in Canada. Here we provide a
comparative analysis of the responses of Canadian and U.S. stock prices to contractionary
monetary policy shocks.
Our results, summarized in Figure 3, show that a contractionary monetary policy shock
leads, upon impact, to a fall in stock prices in both the U.S. and Canada. Note, however,
that stock prices in the U.S. (solid line) fall substantially more than the Canadian stock
prices (dotted line) do in the medium and long term. Figure 3 also shows the time horizon
within which the estimated dynamic responses are statistically di®erent from zero. After
a contractionary policy shock in Canada, the trough of the fall in Canadian stock prices
occurs within four months and the dynamic impact lasts for about the ¯rst 12 months
after the shock. Whereas in the U.S., the decline in stock prices prevails for at least 37
months, and the through of the decline does not occur until 17 months after the shock.
Also, the impact of Canadian monetary shocks on stock prices is milder than that of the
U.S. ones: an unanticipated 25 basis points increase in the U.S. federal funds rate leads to
an immediate (within the ¯rst month) decline in the real U.S. stock prices by 0.55 percent,
whereas an unanticipated 25 basis points increase in the Canadian overnight interest rate
leads to a negligible 0.003 percent immediate decrease in Canadian stock prices. The
peak responses of stock prices to monetary policy shocks are also remarkably di®erent.
In response to a contractionary domestic monetary policy shock, stock prices in the U.S.
decline by about 4 percent within seventeen months after the shock, while Canadian stock
prices only decline by about 0.8 percent within four months after the shock. Note also
25One noticeable di®erence between the U.S. and Canadian results is that in Canada an increase in the
velocity of money (a positive shock to the money equilibrium) leads to a decline in the price level, whereas
in the U.S. a similar shock leads to an increase in the price level. However, an important similarity is the
positive dynamic response of real output to one-time permanent portfolio shocks, even after controlling for
the changes in the money market equilibrium. This suggests the usefulness of augmenting the conventional
models with stock prices, which control for wealth e®ects. Another di®erence is the responses of real
output to aggregate demand shocks.
18that by the time U.S. prices reach their trough, the Canadian stock prices would have
recovered most of their initial losses, and stand at merely 0.42 percent less than their
pre-shock level.
What accounts for the ¯nding that the response of stock prices to monetary policy
shocks has a shorter duration in Canada relative to that of the U.S.? Although these
di®erences appear in estimated dynamic responses of domestic short-term interest rates
to monetary policy shocks both in Canada and the U.S, they ultimately can be traced
to structural di®erences between the two economies. In particular, macroeconomic inter-
dependence and ¯nancial market openness has several noticeable implications. First, in
Canada, the interest rate response is rapid but not very persistent, whereas in the U.S.
the response is prolonged. The latter imparts considerable persistence to decline in asset
prices in the U.S., which is absent in the Canadian data.
Furthermore, upon a contractionary domestic monetary policy shock, the Canadian
dollar appreciates (although slightly) as shown ¯gure 2. Yet, this unanticipated increase
in the short-term Canadian interest rate leads to an expected depreciation of the Canadian
dollar in the medium-to-long horizon. This would in turn lead to an expected increase
in the foreign demand for Canadian goods. In other words, a monetary tightening in
Canada reduces demand for Canadian goods upon impact, but over time the responses
of the exchange rate and foreign demand jointly mitigate the initial response, which
simultaneously increase valuations in the stock market. This dynamic adjustment mecha-
nism in the Canadian economy under a °oating exchange rate regime is quite prominent.
Moreover, a contractionary monetary policy in the U.S. leads to a rise in the Canadian
short-term interest rate (in the short and medium term), a decline in real output (medium
term), and an immediate decline in Canadian stock prices (¯gure 2).
Overall, the results suggest that trade and ¯nancial market openness are important for
the transmission and duration of domestic monetary policy shocks in Canada, and in a
dynamic sense, they help mitigate the initial impact of these shocks on stock prices. In
the next section, we discuss the main sources of volatility in the Canadian and U.S. stock
prices, and whether these also di®er across these two economies.
194.5 Variance decompositions
Table 1 reports the forecast error variance decomposition of stock prices in the baseline
U.S. model, together with two alternative models (alternative U.S. models 1 and 2, which
we will discuss in the next section). The column legends specify the forecast horizon
(months ahead), standard errors, and percentage of variance attributable various struc-
tural shocks. The row legends specify the forecast horizon. The standard errors are listed
with corresponding forecast horizons. Each row shows the percentage distribution of the
forecast error variance attributable to a structural shock given a forecast horizon.
In the baseline U.S. model (table 1, panel (a)), the contribution of monetary policy
shocks (USMP) to the variance of stock prices is about 6% for the ¯rst month, but it
declines to about 2% after the 24-month horizon. The major driving force of the variance
of stock prices for both short and long horizons is the portfolio shock (USPORT), which
accounts for about 86% of the variance within the ¯rst month and declines monotonically
with the time horizon to about 40% by the 48-month. At the 3- to 6-month forecast
horizons money market shocks (USMME) and oil price shocks (OP) each account for
about 10% of the forecast error variance. Beyond a two year horizon the combined
in°uences of aggregate supply (USAS) and demand shocks (USAD), and money market
equilibrium shocks become gradually more important than the portfolio shocks.
Table 2, panel (a) reports the forecast error variance decomposition of stock prices in the
baseline Canadian model. Overall, the contribution of monetary policy shocks (CAMP) to
the variance of stock prices is small and never above 6% for all the horizons. The portfolio
shocks in Canada contribute a (large) 85% share of variance of stock prices in the one-
month ahead forecasts, but this share declines gradually to about 33 percent by the end
of the 4-year horizon. Aggregate supply shocks (CAAS) and aggregate demand shocks
(CAAD) contribute to the variance of stock prices in the medium and long run. These
contributions are very comparable to those in the U.S. model. Trade shocks (CATR) have
an immediate but limited impact (not beyond 4%) on the variance of stock prices. Their
impact on long-horizon forecasts is economically negligible. Also, U.S. monetary policy
shocks (USMP) have a delayed but substantial impact (as high as 16%) on the variance
of the Canadian stock prices.
20Figure 4 shows the proportion of the forecast error variance attributable to monetary
policy shocks both in Canada and the U.S. over di®erent time horizons. In the short run,
a relatively larger proportion of the variance of stock prices is attributable to monetary
policy shocks in the U.S., and the proportion falls rapidly over time and then gradually
rises. In the baseline Canadian model, the proportion of forecast error variance of stock
prices is much lower initially but rises (non-monotonically) over time. In both economies,
however, the contribution of monetary policy shocks to forecast error variance of stock
prices is typically relatively small (under 6%) at all horizons.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In structural VAR analysis, there are often alternative economically plausible short-run
restrictions. The structural VAR model we speci¯ed is no exception. We thus examined
the sensitivity of our results to a battery of alternative identi¯cation restrictions and
speci¯cations. In the interest of space, here we discuss two alternative speci¯cations for
the monetary policy reaction function.26
5.1 The U.S. model
In the baseline U.S. model (\US-B"), the Fed's reaction function depends on the current
values of M2, and the lagged values of all the remaining variables included in the system.
Since both real output and monetary aggregates have ¯rst order e®ects on the direction of
monetary policy, an alternative to the baseline model is to augment this reaction function
by including the contemporaneous values of real output. We label this ¯rst alternative as
\US-AR1." Given the signi¯cance of the oil price for the price level in the U.S. (¯gure 1),
another alternative is to augment the reaction function in the baseline model with the
26We also extended the baseline models by incorporating the producer price index for intermediate
goods into the U.S. model, and an index of commodity prices into the Canadian model, while excluding
the federal funds rate (USR). Statistical model selection criteria|AIC/BIC and likelihood ratio tests|
suggest that the baseline Canadian model with the U.S. federal fund rate is better than the alternative
Canadian model with the commodity price index. The same criteria suggest the alternative U.S. model
with the producer price index has lower AIC/BIC values but a higher log-likelihood function value than
the baseline U.S. model without the producer price index. Moreover, the baseline U.S. model has impulse-
response results that are broadly consistent with the predictions of conventional macroeconomic theories.
21contemporaneous value of the oil price. We label this second alternative as \US-AR2."
These short-run restrictions are summarized in table 3.
Figure 5 (upper panel) presents the results of the dynamic responses of stock prices in
the structural VAR models for the U.S. with three speci¯cations for the Fed's reaction
function (US-B, US-AR1, and US-AR2). The ¯gure also shows the time horizons in which
the estimated impulse responses are statistically signi¯cant (boxes for US-B SG, US-AR1
SG, and US-AR2 SG). As can be seen from ¯gure 5, stock prices respond similarly to
a contractionary monetary policy shock in all three U.S. models|although ranges of
signi¯cant responses vary slightly: with US-B SG being the largest range, and US-AR1
SG being the smallest. The forecast error decompositions are also broadly consistent
across the U.S. models (see table 1, panels a{c).
Overall, while including current output in Fed's reaction function renders the response
of stock prices to a monetary policy shock noisier, and including current oil price increases
the sharpness of our inference, these models provide a consistent picture of (i) the dynamic
negative and signi¯cant response of stock prices to a contractionary monetary policy shock
in the U.S., and (ii) forecast error variance decompositions in which the contribution of
monetary policy shocks are relatively small for short-horizon forecasts, and declines (non-
monotonically) as the forecast horizon increases.
5.2 The Canadian model
In the baseline Canadian model (\CA-B"), the Bank of Canada's reaction function de-
pends on the contemporaneous values of M2 and the exchange rate, and the lagged values
of all the variables included in the system. As an alternative, we augment this reac-
tion function by including the current values of real output, and label this alternative as
\CA-AR1". Given the volatility in the exchange rate market, it is possible that Bank
of Canada may exercise caution in responding to changes in the bilateral exchange rate
and may respond with a lag. Thus, the second alternative to the baseline speci¯cation
(\CA-AR2") only incorporates the contemporaneous values of M2 and real output, as
well as the lagged values of the variables in the VAR system. These short-run restrictions
are summarized in table 4.
22Figure 5 (lower panel) shows the results of the dynamic responses of stock prices in the
structural VAR models for the Canadian VAR with three speci¯cations for the Bank's
reaction function (CA-B, CA-AR1, and CA-AR2), as well as the time horizons in which
the estimated impulse responses are statistically signi¯cant (boxes for CA-B SG, CA-
AR1 SG, and CA-AR2 SG). The results suggest that the response of stock prices to a
contractionary monetary policy shock is quantitatively similar across the three Canadian
models|although the ranges of statistically signi¯cant responses vary slightly.
The forecast error decompositions of stock prices are also broadly consistent across the
three models (table 2).27 The contribution of the U.S. monetary policy shocks (USMP in
table 2) to the forecast error decomposition of Canadian stock prices is also robust to the
short-run restrictions imposed on the Bank's reaction function. In all three speci¯cations,
this contribution is relatively small in horizons under 6 months, but increases to about 15
percent for 12-month horizons and beyond. This sensitivity of domestic asset prices, in
particular, and wealth, in general, in Canada to U.S. monetary policy shocks underscores
the appropriateness of our emphasis on macroeconomic interdependence for modeling
small open economies.
In summary, our estimates of the dynamic responses of stock prices to monetary policy
shocks from the baseline Canadian and U.S. models are robust to alternative (and eco-
nomically plausible) speci¯cations of the central banks' reaction functions. And, we ¯nd
that there are indeed economically meaningful, and signi¯cant di®erences between the
Canadian and U.S. dynamic responses. The peak response in Canada occurs relatively
fast (within a quarter), and the statistically signi¯cant impact of a domestic contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock on stock prices disappears after about a year. By contrast,
in the U.S. the peak response occurs much later (after about 6 quarters) and the statisti-
cally signi¯cant response is much more prolonged (about 2.5 to 3 years). Quantitatively,
the peak response of stock prices to domestic monetary policy shocks are signi¯cantly
27There are, however, two signi¯cant di®erences worth mentioning. When contemporaneous values of
real output are included in the Bank's reaction function, the contribution of monetary policy shocks to
stock price uncertainty in long horizons increases, and this largely comes at the expense of the contribution
of aggregate demand shocks. Excluding the contemporaneous values of bilateral exchange rate from the
Bank's reaction function, while maintaining the current values of real output, on the other hand, reduces
the contribution of monetary policy shocks to stock price forecast variance, and increases that of money
market equilibrium shocks.
23stronger in the U.S. In both economies portfolio shocks have signi¯cant dynamic impacts
on real output suggesting that the inclusion of stock prices in a VAR model has economi-
cally important implications for aggregate demand. Furthermore, in both stock markets,
portfolio shocks are the dominant sources of forecast error decomposition of stock prices,
especially in the short horizons. The preponderance of such shocks, we think, present sig-
ni¯cant practical challenges for those proposals that recommend using monetary policy
to in°uence asset price \misalignments."
6 Conclusion
In this study, we evaluated the economic signi¯cance of the stock prices in the transmis-
sion of domestic monetary policy shocks in Canada and the U.S. by incorporating stock
prices into empirical monetary business-cycle models featuring open and closed economies,
respectively. We relied on macroeconomic theories to impose short-run restrictions on the
structural VAR models and to identify impulse responses, which provide valuable eco-
nomic insights. We found that in response to an unanticipated 25 basis points increase
in the instrument interest rate, stock prices in the U.S. decline by about 4 percent within
seventeen months after the shock, and in Canada they only decline by about 0.8 percent
within merely four months after the shock. These di®erences are largely attributable to
the di®erent dynamic responses of domestic short-term interest rates to monetary policy
shocks. In Canada, the interest rate response is rapid, but not very persistent, whereas
in the U.S. the response is prolonged.
We also paid particular attention to the di®erences in macroeconomic interdependence
between these two economies, especially through external demand and monetary policy
shocks. We found that monetary policy shocks in the U.S. have signi¯cant impact on
the Canadian stock prices and contribute substantially to their variance. We also found
that the contribution of external demand shocks to Canadian stock price variance is very
small, suggesting that the °exible exchange rate acts as an important automatic stabilizer
for the Canadian stock prices.
Our results, therefore, suggest that incorporating wealth e®ects into empirical open
economy monetary-business cycle models is important in understanding the transmission
24of monetary policy shocks. We did not, however, distinguish between foreign and domestic
currency denominated asset holdings of domestic residents. We also did not include
shocks to real estate. Incorporating these re¯nements, and examining whether they have
substantive in°uence on our ¯ndings from VAR models with short-run restrictions are left
for future research.
25A Data description and sources
All Canadian data are from CANSIMII.
² Industrial production (CAY): table 379-0019 series v2036138, GDP at basic prices,
seasonally adjusted, 1997 constant dollars, all industries.
² Consumer price index (CAP): table 326-0001 series v735319, seasonally adjusted,
1996 basket, all items.
² Overnight interest rate (CAR): table 176-0043 series v122514.
² M2: (CAM2) table 176-0025 series v37128, seasonally adjusted, in millions.
² Stock prices (CASP): table 176-0047 series v122620, S&P TSE (300) composite
index, close price.
² Exchange rate (E): table 176-0064 series v37426, U.S. dollar in Canadian units.
All U.S. data are also from CANSIMII, unless otherwise stated.
² Industrial production index (USY): table 451-0019 series v19650248, seasonally ad-
justed, 1997=100.
² Consumer price index (USP): table 451-0009 series v11123, seasonally adjusted,
1996 basket, all items.
² Federal funds rate (USR): table 176-0044 series v122150.
² M2: (USM2) table 451-0007 series v122446, seasonally adjusted, in millions.
² Stock prices (USSP): Standard & Poor's composite index. From Robert Shiller's
webpage accessed at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/.
² Oil price (OP): crude oil price index, 1995=100, the average of three spot prices-
Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and Dubai Fateh. From International Fi-
nancial Statistics.
We normalize stock indexes by consumer price indexes, so our interpretation of stock
prices is in real terms. We measure the exchange rate as the Canadian dollar price of one
U.S. dollar, so an increase in E corresponds to a depreciation of the Canadian dollar. In
our empirical analysis, we express all variables in natural logarithms, except the interest
rates (CAR and USR). Table A.1 reports summary statistics of the data used in the
analysis.
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29Table 1: Real stock price forecast error decompositions, the U.S. models
Months Standard
Percentage of variance attributable to the shock
ahead error USAS USAD USMME USMP USPORT OP
a) Baseline US Model
1 0.027 1.058 1.887 3.362 6.220 85.560 1.913
3 0.052 2.268 2.810 8.391 4.754 71.221 10.556
6 0.068 1.520 7.089 9.549 3.478 68.039 10.325
12 0.097 2.441 13.811 16.247 1.749 60.066 5.685
24 0.132 13.890 14.814 15.562 1.853 49.631 4.251
36 0.146 24.665 13.400 14.055 2.884 41.473 3.523
48 0.150 26.541 12.916 13.885 3.139 40.008 3.511
b) Alternative US Model 1
1 0.027 0.959 1.915 3.418 6.185 85.618 1.905
3 0.052 2.146 2.851 8.466 4.708 71.273 10.556
6 0.068 1.435 7.148 9.610 3.436 68.049 10.322
12 0.097 2.399 13.894 16.272 1.724 60.029 5.682
24 0.132 13.745 14.908 15.567 1.858 49.664 4.259
36 0.146 24.424 13.503 14.067 2.904 41.566 3.536
48 0.150 26.285 13.018 13.898 3.163 40.112 3.524
c) Alternative US Model 2
1 0.027 1.086 2.183 4.022 5.695 85.848 1.165
3 0.052 2.305 3.269 9.271 4.154 71.724 9.277
6 0.068 1.536 7.733 10.257 2.970 68.214 9.290
12 0.098 2.446 14.706 16.504 1.470 59.677 5.197
24 0.132 13.845 15.541 15.303 1.875 49.137 4.299
36 0.147 24.583 14.020 13.653 2.988 41.081 3.675
48 0.151 26.482 13.510 13.454 3.270 39.671 3.613
Notes: Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. See Sections 3.2 and 5, and Tables 3 and 4 for
model speci¯cations and identifying restrictions.
30Table 2: Real stock price forecast error decompositions, the Canadian models
Months Standard
Percentage of variance attributable to the shock
ahead error CAAS CAAD CAMME CAMP CAPORT CATR USMP
a) Baseline Canadian Model
1 0.037 4.376 0.628 0.490 2.621 85.395 4.490 1.999
3 0.061 8.320 0.408 4.636 4.518 77.676 3.623 0.820
6 0.079 14.781 0.427 9.507 3.096 65.324 2.825 4.041
12 0.097 15.004 4.504 12.864 2.186 48.323 2.916 14.203
24 0.112 13.268 11.517 15.123 4.018 37.260 2.753 16.062
36 0.117 15.090 12.723 14.197 5.227 34.425 2.662 15.675
48 0.119 15.667 13.041 14.411 5.278 33.261 2.691 15.651
b) Alternative Canadian Model 1
1 0.037 4.654 7.452 0.550 0.008 84.882 0.115 2.339
3 0.061 8.884 9.145 0.804 1.282 77.222 1.700 0.963
6 0.079 15.304 7.902 1.507 4.918 65.087 1.385 3.897
12 0.096 15.819 7.165 2.943 8.483 49.247 3.738 12.606
24 0.110 14.172 5.891 7.901 13.408 38.613 6.106 13.909
36 0.115 16.074 6.243 9.603 12.804 35.529 5.979 13.767
48 0.117 16.639 6.577 10.167 12.683 34.241 5.856 13.838
c) Alternative Canadian Model 2
1 0.037 4.667 6.408 0.135 0.100 84.775 1.476 2.439
3 0.061 8.794 5.003 3.071 1.972 77.219 2.961 0.979
6 0.079 15.235 4.794 6.588 2.268 65.091 2.119 3.905
12 0.097 15.500 3.581 13.572 1.787 48.737 3.219 13.604
24 0.111 13.771 5.249 22.062 1.850 37.984 3.654 15.430
36 0.116 15.735 7.394 21.082 2.296 35.036 3.413 15.044
48 0.118 16.338 8.489 20.494 2.450 33.815 3.430 14.984
Notes: Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. See Sections 3.2 and 5, and Tables 3 and 4 for
model speci¯cations and identifying restrictions.
31Table 3: Summary of alternative identifying restrictions and models, U.S.
a) Restrictions on Fed's reaction function
Baseline Rt = a40 ¡ a43M2t + f4(yt¡l) + ºUSMP;t
Alternative 1 Rt = a40 + a41Yt ¡ a43M2t + f4(yt¡l) + ºUSMP;t
Alternative 2 Rt = a40 ¡ a43M2t + a46OPt + f4(yt¡l) + ºUSMP;t
b) Models










1 0 0 0 0 a16
a21 1 0 0 0 ¡a26
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32Table 4: Summary of alternative identifying restrictions and models, Canada
a) Restrictions on the Bank's reaction function
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33Table A.1: Summary statistics, 1988:1{2003:12
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Canada CAY 13.5992 0.1345 13.4218 13.8428
CAP 4.6476 0.0990 4.4188 4.8106
CAM2 12.9663 0.1822 12.4992 13.2945
CAR 0.0615 0.0309 0.0199 0.1380
CASP 3.8927 0.2731 3.4833 4.5926
E 0.2989 0.1024 0.1203 0.4702
U.S. USY 4.5265 0.1604 4.3135 4.7570
USP 4.6035 0.1306 4.3294 4.7999
USM2 8.2786 0.2145 7.9559 8.7189
USR 0.0507 0.0217 0.0098 0.0985
USSP 1.8479 0.4279 1.1940 2.5725
OP 3.0441 0.2434 2.4230 3.5813
Notes: The number of observations is 192. Stock indexes are normalized by consumer price indexes.
The exchange rate is the Canadian dollar price of one U.S. dollar. All variables are in natural logarithms,
except the interest rates (CAR and USR). See also appendix A for detailed data descriptions and sources.
34Figure 1. Dynamic responses to structural shocks in the baseline U.S. model with short-run restrictions as in equation (9) (intervals between the dashed lines 
correspond to two standard errors) 




































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 2. Dynamic responses to structural shocks in the baseline Canadian model with short-run restrictions as in equation (10) (intervals between the dashed lines 
correspond to two standard errors) 
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